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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The hostile takeover regulatory regime has evolved in response to proxy 
 
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contests and tender offers.1  Due to a lack of federal interest, states (mainly 
Delaware) have stepped in to provide rules of the game for this area of 
corporate law.2  Delaware mainly focuses on fiduciary doctrines and standards 
of review.3 
The regulatory regime evolved to create a merger doctrine, which allows 
Board of Directors (Boards) to fend off unwelcomed suitors by implementing 
procedures that make takeover attempts costly; i.e., they were allowed to 
deploy “poison pills.”4   These pills have proven their ability to negatively 
impact market participants by shielding inept and corrupt leaders in huge 
companies like Enron, WorldCom, and Countrywide.5  The downfall of these 
companies negatively affected stakeholders and resulted in significant 
unemployment.6 The necessary solution is to repeal poison pill legislation.  
In essence, the poison pill provides boards with too much control. Boards 
can deny shareholders access to fair offers.7  They can also adopt poison pills 
quickly without shareholder approval. 8   Boards have the ability to repel 
acquirers by making the acquisition too costly.  They use the poison pill to 
dilute acquisition efforts and increase the time it takes to acquire a company by 
replacing a board.9  As such, poison pill legislation should be replaced with 
statutes that allow shareholders to entertain bids for their company's acquisition 
without having the board of directors determine whether the shareholders can 
review these offers.   
Boards can also utilize the pill to increase costs by using it as a 
bargaining tool to obtain excessive compensation packages.10  Although this 
 
1 John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging 
Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 219, 239–40 (2011). 
2 Id. at 241–42. 
3 Id. at 241–46. 
4 Id.  Generally, a poison pill defense maneuver can consist of boards issuing stock rights to 
all shareholders, except the hostile bidder, to purchase additional shares at 2-for-1 pricing, thus 
diluting the raider’s capability.  Id. 
5 See KATALINA M. BIANCO, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE 
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 6–15 (CCH 2008), http://business.cch.com/bankingfinance/focus/news/ 
Subprime_WP_rev.pdf; see also The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time, 
ACCOUNTING-DEGREE.COM, http://www.accounting-degree.org/scandals/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014). 
6 BIANCO, supra note 5. 
7 Sang Yop Kang, Transplanting a Poison Pill to Controlling Shareholder Regimes—Why It 
Is So Difficult, 33 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 619, 622 (2013). 
8 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 379 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 2009). 
9 Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians 
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993). 
10 Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover 
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 908 (2002). 
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move has enabled mergers to move forward by making hostile bids friendlier,11 
it comes at a cost.12   It also rewards bad performance connected with the 
underperforming target.13 
Digging deeper into the problem, the regulatory regime is tied to 
politicians who craft underlying regulations.14  Politicians, burdened with an 
interest in maintaining the power associated with their office, may favor the 
interests of corporations that make huge political donations compared to the 
general public, whose donations are far smaller.  Politicians, as agents of the 
general public, should owe shareholders a duty of loyalty.15  This could open 
the door to shareholders being able to entertain fair offers without intrusive 
board oversight.  
Importantly, shareholders have the right to sell their shares.16  This right 
should be protected,17 and directors should not be able to interfere with it.18  As 
such, legislators should reconsider statutes authorizing poison pills and repeal 
them.  
This Note progresses as follows: Part II discusses how the hostile 
takeover regime developed.  This section provides a brief history, including a 
hostile takeover overview and an explanation of Delaware fiduciary doctrines.  
The section also provides a glimpse of the negative impact poison pills have on 
market participants by describing the tension between key players and recent 
adverse activity.  Part III provides an analysis of poison pill ramifications and 
why these shareholder rights plans should be repealed.  It proceeds by arguing 
that corporate boards have too much control.  This section ties control to 
executive compensation and the board’s ability to influence legislation through 
political donations.  Part III also provides a remedy related to statutory regimes 
and shareholders’ right to vote.  Finally, Part IV provides the conclusion that 
poison pill legislation should be repealed because it typically limits shareholder 
property rights by allowing company board of directors to decide whether the 
 
11 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: 
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 899–900 (2002). 
12 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6–7 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2004). 
13 Id. 
14 Robert G. Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration From the 
Reign of Trajan, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 211–32 (2001). 
15 Id. 
16 See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
407, 413–24 (2006).  
17 Id. at 450. 
18 Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 672 
(2007). 
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shareholders can vote to accept or deny offers for their shares.  Legislatures 
should adjust statutory regimes to respect shareholder’s ownership rights to the 
extent that they are allowed to sell their shares without having boards as 
gatekeepers.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Brief History of Hostile Takeovers and Related Regulations 
The hostile takeover regulatory regime has evolved in response to 
strategies utilized to acquire corporate control, mainly proxy contests and 
tender offers.  Where the federal government has left a gap, states have stepped 
in to provide the regulatory guidance to assess takeover activities.19   This 
guidance is rooted in fiduciary duties and standards.20 
1.  Hostile Takeover Overview 
Prior to 1960, the primary means for affecting a hostile takeover was the 
proxy contest.21  The proxy contest was mainly regulated by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.22  State courts addressed lawsuits focused on unethical 
behavior of target company boards.23  Beginning in the mid-1960s, the (cash) 
tender offer was a preferred investment vehicle for acquiring a company.24  
Due to the abusive nature of this tactic, Congress passed the Williams Act of 
1968,25 which imposed important disclosure and procedure requirements for 
tender offers.26  However, the Williams Act failed to regulate unethical target 
board defenses.27  In response to the lack of interest of Congress, federal and 
state agencies, and the Supreme Court, Delaware was thrust into the forefront 
and began to develop the fundamental regime for this area of corporate law in 
 
19 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 241–47. 
20 Id. 
21 Armour et al., supra note 1. 
22  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78n (2010); Solicitation of 
Proxies, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2010). 
23 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 240. 
24 Id. 
25 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, 455–56 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m–78n (2006)).  Raiders made high-priced tender offers to 
shareholders on a “first-come first-served” basis.  See Armour et al., supra note 1, at 241–42.  This 
tactic intimidated shareholders into selling their shares.  Id.  The tactic also prevented target 
company boards from defending against hostile attempts.  Id. 
26 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 241. 
27 Id. at 241. 
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1985.28  It is within this framework that the laws regulating board conduct 
originated and continues to evolve.29 
2.  New Delaware Fiduciary Doctrines  
  At this time, the federal government lacked interest in regulating board 
responses to takeover measures.30  As Delaware was (and continues to be) the 
primary state of incorporation for most public companies, it was forced to 
develop rules to address unethical board responses to unwelcomed bids.31  In 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court decided 
that a target board has the fiduciary duty and power to protect shareholders 
from hostile bidders deemed to be a threat to company and shareholder 
interests and to take measures proportionate to the threat.32 
The Delaware Supreme Court also developed entirely new standards of 
review, the “intermediate standards,” between 1985 and 1988.33  The Blasius 
Industries v. Atlas Corp. (“Blasius”) standard requires that boards show 
“compelling justification” for actions deemed intentional with regards to 
interfering with shareholders’ right to vote for an alternative board.34  The 
Blasius court devised this standard to address the poison pill defense.35  In 
Moran v. Household International Inc., the court upheld the “pre-planned” use 
of the poison pill.36  As a result, the poison pill became the favored defense 
mechanism in the United States.37 
B.  Negative Impact on Market Participants 
As with any process, the hostile takeover regulatory regime created 
 
28 Id. at 241–42. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.  The SEC also had little interest in regulating board tactics, such as the poison pill.  Id.  
Additionally, the Supreme Court “essentially sidelined federal judges and state legislatures with 
respect to such corporate governance matters.”  Id. 
31 Id. at 241–42. 
32 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985). 
33 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 246. 
34 Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 652 (Del. Ch. 1988).  Blasius is still good law, 
as it was recently cited in a current Delaware case.  See Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 
242, 258 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
35 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 246. 
36 Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985).  The court noted that 
“pre-planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce the risk that, under the 
pressure of a takeover bid, management will fail to exercise reasonable judgment.”  Id. 
37 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 246. 
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results as it evolved.  This section will show some of the tensions that 
developed during this regime’s early evolutionary period.  This section will 
then go a step further to help the reader understand this area of corporate law 
by tying recent negative market results to it.  The recent negative activity fuels 
support to the idea that the current hostile takeover regulatory regime should be 
repealed.      
1.  Tension Between the Raiders and the Business Roundtable 
  While the statutory regime developed, key players such as the corporate 
raiders and the Business Roundtable took their positions on opposite sides.38  
Raiders wanted to realize the underlying values of target companies, and 
shareholders stood to gain because some of this value could have been 
transferred to the shareholders.39  However, boards fought against this push by 
utilizing groups like the Business Roundtable to lobby for big business.40  The 
Business Roundtable lobbied Congress in the 1970s and 1980s, claiming that 
acquisitions were acceptable.41  However, Michael Milken came along and 
forced some of these large corporations to succumb to his junk bond financing; 
this was unacceptable. 42   According to the Roundtable, the big company 
acquiring the little company was free enterprise; whereas, the little company 
acquiring the big company was ‘un-American.’43  Even though the Roundtable 
CEOs owned less than 1/300 of one percent of their companies’ outstanding 
shares, they controlled the company assets, which were worth billions.44 
Although lobbying at the federal level did not completely satisfy their 
needs, the Roundtable and its allies continued to pursue their goals at the state 
 
38 ROBERT SOBEL, DANGEROUS DREAMERS: THE FINANCIAL INNOVATORS FROM CHARLES 
MERRILL TO MICHAEL MILKEN 147–48 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1993).  The Business Roundtable 
was a pro-big business lobbying group that served as a liaison between powerful CEOs and 
Washington politicians who could help pass favorable legislation.  Id.  It was through the efforts of 
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Chairman in 1972 that the Business 
Roundtable came to existence with members from some of the country’s largest organizations.  Id. 
39 Id. at 121–35. 
40 Id. at 147–48. 
41 Id. 
42  Id. at 62–63.  Michael Milken is a Berkeley educated Wharton MBA.  Id.  Having 
subscribed to the notion that low-rated, high-risk bonds could generate higher yields than their 
counterparts, Michael Milken changed the finance industry by attracting investors to junk bonds.  
Id. at 64–71.  He subsequently generated revenue for known and unknown financiers who were 
interested in acquiring control of corporations.  Id. at 90–99. 
43 Id. at 147–48.   
44 SOBEL, supra note 38, at 147–48. 
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level, where they realized much more success.45  For instance, in 1987 the 
Washington state legislature passed SB 608446 to protect the biggest company 
in the state, Boeing, from one of Milken’s raiders – T. Boone Pickens. 47  
Arizona also passed takeover legislation to protect the Greyhound Bus 
Corporation from a perceived hostile threat.48  Similarly, Indiana passed the 
Indiana Control Share Acquisition Statute to protect CTS Corporation from a 
takeover by Dynamics Corporation of America.49  Massachusetts followed the 
Indiana statute when it enacted legislation50 to protect Gillette from Revlon, 
which was controlled by another Milken raider – Ronald Perelman. 51  
Moreover, some twenty-one states passed legislation to protect their domiciled 
companies from junk bond financing.52 
2.  Recent Negative Impact    
Prior to poison pills, U.S. companies sat on unrealized value.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that pieces of companies were worth more than the whole 
business enterprise, gains in the billions were reported on investments in the 
 
45 Id. at 170–71. 
46 Kathryn Wakefield, Just-in-Time Legislation: Do Corporation-Specific Statutes Violate 
State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special  Legislation?, 61 U. PITT L. REV. 843, 854 (2000) 
(citing New Washington Takeover Law Aimed at Protecting Boeing from Pickens Raid, SEC. REG. 
L. REP. (BNA),  Aug. 14, 1987, at 1266).  This bill stated that Boeing could not engage in any of 
the significant business transactions with someone trying to acquire the company for five years 
after that person acquired 10 percent or more of the target corporation's shares without the Board’s 
approval.  Id. 
47 SOBEL, supra note 38, at 136–40.  T. Boone Pickens is a renowned corporate raider, having 
proven himself by running oil companies efficiently and making them profitable.  Id.  He was a 
“David” amongst Goliaths when he recognized underperforming companies and sought to utilize 
Milken’s war chest of money as a slingshot to take them down by acquiring them.  Id. 
48 Id. at 851 (citing Arizona Antitakeover Bill Signed During Special Session, SEC. REG. L. 
REP. (BNA), July 31, 1987, at 1338).  The law limited the voting rights of shares accumulated for a 
hostile takeover, although the shares could be voted to elect directors or managers. Id. 
49 Id. at 848.  The Indiana Control Share Acquisition Statute prevented hostile acquirers from 
exercising voting power without approval from a majority of the remaining shareholders.  Burns 
Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-42-2.  The Court upheld this statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).  Id. 
50 Wakefield, supra note 46, at 851 (citing Massachusetts Adopts Broad Anti-Takeover Law, 
19  SEC. REG. L. REP. 1099, (1987).  The legislation stripped investors acquiring twenty percent or 
more of a company of voting rights unless the non-management shareholders voted to reinstate 
those rights.  Id.  See also Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: 
State Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 714 (1988). 
51 SOBEL, supra note 38, at 88.  Ron Perelman is another Milken raider, made famous by his 
acquisition of Revlon and wreaking havoc by, as virtually a no one, taking down large companies.  
Id. 
52 Id. at 170–71. 
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millions, and investors were realizing huge returns of almost fifty percent.53  In 
fact, Leveraged Buyout (LBO) investors realized average transactional gains of 
about ninety-six percent.54 
When companies sit on unrealized value, other negative consequences 
can occur.  For instance, income disparity can increase when company value is 
underutilized because the few who control companies are better positioned to 
exploit market weaknesses. 55   Large corporations are positioned to control 
output and raise prices.56  Companies have the power to manufacture consumer 
demands to the point where the public makes purchases that they do not need.57  
Furthermore, corporate boards and officers become renegades, understanding 
that they can pay shareholders relatively small amounts of appeasement money 
while utilizing the lion’s share of profits for their own benefit.58  As such, these 
profits have gone to the few at the expense of the many.59 
Additionally, unemployment can occur when companies choose to 
continue operating inefficiently, rather than subscribing to new ownership and 
new ideas.60  Enron was born in 1985 when Houston Gas Company merged 
with Internorth Inc.61  While facing the possibility of bankruptcy during its 
infancy, Enron fought off a hostile takeover attempt.62  Rather than succumbing 
to raiders, the company chose to replace its CEO with Jeffrey Skilling.63  In the 
 
53 Tony Ablum & Mary Beth Burgis, Leveraged Buyouts: The Ever Changing Landscape, 13 
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 109, 113–14 (2000). 
54 See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 29–49 (Foundation Press 2nd ed. 
2007).  “LBO” translates to Leveraged Buyout. SOBEL, supra note 38, at 97.  This is a way to 
acquire a company by using its underlying value as equity for financing.  Id. 
55  John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, COMMENTARY (Aug. 1, 1958, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-affluent-society-by-john-kenneth-galbraith/.  
The few who control companies distract less fortunate consumers from moving to upper income 
brackets by manufacturing wants along with the products to satisfy these wants. Id.   
56 Daniel James, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, by Adolf A. Berle Jr. & 
Gardiner C. Means, 8 IND. L.J. 8, 11 (1933) (Book Review), http://www.repository.law.indiana. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5120&context=ilj. 
57 See generally Galbraith, supra note 55. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See, e.g., Clinton Free, et al., Management Controls: The Organizational Fraud Triangle of 
Leadership, Culture and Control in Enron, IVEY BUS. J. (July/Aug. 2007), http:// 
iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/the-organization/management-controls-the-organizational-fraud-
triangle-of-leadership-culture-and-control-in-enron#.Unb5YflJMdU.  Enron’s inefficient 
operations consisted of operating outside of regulatory frameworks.  Id.  As a result, thousands lost 
their jobs.  Id.   
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  Jeffrey Skilling, as CEO, was instrumental in creating a corporate culture that enabled 
the subversion of Enron’s management controls for preventing fraudulent practices.  Id.    
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end, Enron failed, over 4,000 employees lost their jobs and pensions, and 
Skilling went to jail.64 
WorldCom provides another example of a negative effect of the poison 
pill. WorldCom renewed its poison pill during the spring of 2002.65   The 
company reported adopting the measure to protect shareholders from someone 
shortchanging them by offering a low price for a WorldCom that was 
extremely undervalued.66  Mind you, WorldCom’s stock appeared to be in a 
free fall because, having traded for $64.50 about three years previously, it was 
trading for less than $10.67  Stock price factors in to the market’s perception of 
the effectiveness of company management in terms of maximizing value.68  
The drop in WorldCom’s stock price suggests that, comparatively, the market 
did not sanction the business acumen of WorldCom’s leadership.69  As such, 
the management team was busy re-deploying the poison pill while the market 
probably preferred that WorldCom protect itself from its current leadership.   
Generally, companies deploy poison pills to protect shareholder value.70  
Poison pills work by making hostile attempts too expensive when acquirers 
have to purchase additional shares to make up for the dilution the pill creates in 
their existing shares.71  However, who protects company shareholders from 
management and boards that lack business acumen?  Who will help the 
shareholder avoid having to wait multiple years to replace leaders who do not 
ensure that the company recognize and capitalize on necessary synergies?  
Moreover, who will ensure the viability of the company, when current leaders 
fail, in terms of its ability to generate finances necessary to procure resources 
and efficiently cut costs needed for growth and value maximization?  
Importantly, who protects the existing company from leaders who make up for 
the lack of business acumen with fraud?  The effects of fraud oftentimes extend 
beyond the company to other stakeholders, including the general public.72 
 
64 William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and Other 
Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1277 
(2002). 
65 Shawn Young, WorldCom, Its Shares Swooning, Renews Expired Poison-Pill Plan, WALL 
ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1015800932650408240 (last updated Mar. 11, 2002, 12:01 
AM).  
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See Why Do Companies Care About Their Stock Prices?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www. 
investopedia.com/articles/basics/03/020703.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
69 See id. 
70 Jennifer Mears, Companies Turn to 'Poison Pills', NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 18, 2002, at 64 
[hereinafter Mears]. 
71 Id. 
72 See The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time, supra note 5.   
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The fact of the matter is that “poison pill[s] protect[] existing 
management.”73  As noted earlier, WorldCom renewed its pill during the winter 
of 2002.74  By the summer solstice, a massive accounting fraud was discovered 
at the company.75  Whereas the stock was trading at around $65 about two 
years earlier, and about $10 three months earlier, by the summer it traded at 21 
cents as a direct result of the uncovered fraud.76  The pill had the effect of 
insulating management who were a direct threat to the company and by 
extension, shareholder value.77 
WorldCom’s CEO, Bernie Ebbers, was convicted for his role in the 
corporate fraud.78  WorldCom’s fraud was the biggest in the current wave, 
which included those associated with companies such as Enron and Adelphia.79  
The fraud consisted of an “accounting slight-of-hand,” whereby expenses for 
capital maintenance were recorded as capital (asset) expenditures. 80   This 
practice enabled WorldCom to manage industry reported cash flows and profits 
by conveniently spreading costs over multiple reporting periods.81  While the 
company enjoyed the benefits of the pill, i.e., protection from someone who 
might offer a low price for a WorldCom that was extremely undervalued, 
WorldCom leadership was busy utilizing accounting fraud practices which 
inflated assets and profits by as much as $11 billion and $3.8 billion 
respectively.82  It took only five quarters to accomplish this feat.83  More to the 
point, it took five quarters to commit fraud resulting in 30,000 lost jobs and 
$180 billion in investor losses.84  Ebbers was convicted for his role in the fraud 
and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, while having previously justified 
using the poison pill to protect shareholders from someone shortchanging 
them.85 
Similarly, Countrywide was a huge subprime lender during the period 
 
73 Mears, supra note 70 (alterations in original). 
74 Young, supra note 65.   
75 Massive Accounting Fraud Fells WorldCom, TIME (June 26, 2002), http://content.time. 
com/time/business/article/0,8599,266287,00.html. 
76 Id.   
77 See id.   
78  Krysten Crawford, Ebbers Gets 25 Years, CNN MONEY (Sept. 23, 2005, 7:42 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/13/news/newsmakers/ebbers_sentence/. 
79 Id. 
80 Massive Accounting Fraud Fells WorldCom, supra note 75. 
81 Id.   
82 The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time, supra note 5. 
83 Massive Accounting Fraud Fells WorldCom, supra note 75. 
84 The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time, supra note 5. 
85 Massive Accounting Fraud Fells WorldCom, supra note 75. 
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that led up to the recent economic downturn.86  Eager for profits, lenders like 
Countrywide accommodated an increase in mortgage demand by taking risks 
and creating ways to lend money to less than credit-worthy borrowers.87  These 
borrowers were able to increase consumer spending by refinancing and pulling 
equity out of over-priced properties.88  
However, the market corrected itself and consumer spending decreased 
because mortgage payment amounts increased faster than home values.89  The 
effects hit cities, like Detroit, where auto sales decreased, unemployment 
increased, and housing values decreased.90  Unemployed Detroit homeowners, 
faced with rising mortgage payments on properties that were decreasing in 
value, experienced foreclosure. 91   Today, this translates into blight. 92   The 
corporation law regulatory regime facilitated the Detroit blight by enabling 
companies like Countrywide to be shielded by poison pills and promulgate 
lending policies that allowed consumers to qualify for mortgages that would 
inevitably result in foreclosure.93  Countrywide had a poison pill in place as 
late as 2008, when it was forced to allow a friendly acquisition by Bank of 
America. 94   If the poison pill was not in place, an owner with a better 
management team could have avoided the need to push the boundaries and 
contribute to one of the worst recessions this country has experienced.95  
Boards of directors at companies like WorldCom have the power to 
refuse to relinquish control of underperforming companies.96  This power is 
derived from poison pill legislation.  Stakeholders should not be asked to act as 
if target board of directors will not place their interests above the stakeholder 
interests.  Should we also believe that boards will not use company resources to 
support politicians who vote for poison pill legislation?  The analysis section 
will examine why poison pill legislation should be repealed and replaced with 
 
86 See BIANCO, supra note 5, at 8.    
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Douglas Jamiel, Detroit's Dan Gilbert: Henry Ford or Henry Potter?, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 22, 
2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/20604-detroits-dan-gilbert-henry-ford-or-
henry-potter. 
93 BIANCO, supra note 5. 
94  Bill Miller: Can’t Decide on Countrywide, CNN MONEY (Feb. 12, 2008, 2:06 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/12/markets/bill_miller/. 
95 See Bianco, supra note 5, at 6–8.  Some say that a rise in unregulated lenders who peddled 
suprime loan products such as adjustable rate, interest-only, and “stated income” mortgages 
contributed to the recent recession.  Id.   
96 Young, supra note 65. 
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statutes that ensure shareholder control over their share ownership rights 
without having target board of directors make a decision about whether the 
shareholders can have a vote and exercise those rights.  
III.  ANALYSIS 
The hostile takeover regulatory regime has evolved to a point where 
recent negative market results can be tied to it.  In furthering the notion that 
this regulatory regime should be repealed, the next section gets to the root of 
the problem by highlighting the abundance of control target company board of 
directors have and the ways they use it to help politicians, sympathetic to their 
cause, entrench themselves.  Additionally, this section provides the following 
adequately robust solution: Repeal current anti-takeover statutes and replace 
them with shareholder-friendly legislation that favors shareholders being able 
to vote on whether to entertain bids for the company without having a board of 
directors determine whether they should have this vote.      
A.  Poison Pills Provide Boards Too Much Control 
 Developments over the recent business cycle indicate that the hostile 
takeover regulatory regime can facilitate significant economic downside results 
because maneuvers such as poison pill deployment enable corporate boards to 
neglect broad-based shareholder interests.97  Poison pills provide boards with 
too much control.  These pills allow boards to hold companies hostage and 
command compensation packages in exchange for relinquishing corporate 
control.  Boards can also utilize company resources to lobby for favorable 
legislation, at the expense of shareholder owners.  Legislatures should adjust 
statutory regimes to respect shareholders’ ownership rights to the extent that 
they are allowed to sell their shares without having boards as gatekeepers.  
Justification for poison pills is rooted in the need for corporations to have 
independent boards.98  However, outside directors may be independent in form 
but not so in fact.99  Outside directors often have personal ties to executives.100  
 
97 The Great Recession, ST. WORKING AM., http://stateofworkingamerica.org/great-recession/ 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2014).  Triggered by an $8 trillion dollar housing bubble, the Great Recession 
brought the United States a tremendous loss of wealth and a sharp cutback in consumer spending, 
with high unemployment being the obvious result.  Id. 
98 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949–50 (Del. 1985); Moran 
v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985). 
99 See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 921–30 (Del. Ch. 2003).  An 
outside director is one deemed independent, i.e., one who does not have a material interest in the 
company.  Id.  In this case, a member of a special litigation committee was a Stanford professor 
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For instance, eleven of the fourteen Enron board members were (supposedly) 
independent at the time of its scandal.101  
Around the early 1990s, the Delaware pill102 evolved to allow boards to 
refuse reasonably fair offers, i.e., they could “just say no.”103  Boards can adopt 
poison pills relatively quickly, without shareholders’ approval, by a board 
resolution within the few hours it takes to convene and hold a vote.104  As such, 
every (Delaware) corporation has a latent shareholders’ rights plan/poison pill, 
although it might not have surfaced at the time of a hostile bid.105  
Target boards even went as far as to try and block shareholders’ ballot 
box recourse by creating poison pill offshoots such as the “dead pan 
provision,” which only allowed incumbent board members or their chosen 
successors to redeem a poison pill. 106   The Delaware Chancery court 
invalidated this provision, noting that it precluded proxy contests, which were 
used by Raiders to elect a new board who would redeem the poison pill.107  In 
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, the slow hand pill, which was non-
redeemable for six months, was also invalidated.108  Still, the hostile takeover 
wars have succumb to the “impermeable” poison pill because proxy fights and 
tender offers are inefficient in terms of the time it takes to replace opposing 
   
who had taught one of the directors under investigation, while other directors had contributed to 
Stanford.  Id.   
100 Id.   
101 See Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1175, 1176 (2011); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002). 
102 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8.     
103 Kang, supra note 7.  In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Time’s board 
refused a premium, non-coercive offer, and the Delaware Supreme Court upheld this refusal stating 
that the Unocal test allowed the board to substitute its judgment for the shareholders’ “ignorance or 
mistaken belief.”  Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989). 
104 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8; see also John Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of 
the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 286–87 (2000). 
105 Coates IV, supra note 104, at 288–89.  This is because the Moran court made pills 
legitimate.  Id.   
106 Jack B. Jacobs, Implementing Japan’s New Anti-Takeover Defense Guidelines—Part 1: 
Some Lessons from Delaware’s Experience in Crafting Fair Takeover Rules, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 
323, 348 (2006). 
107 Carmody v. Toll Bros, Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1998).  A newly elected board 
favoring the deal would be precluded from acting.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment 
Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 17 
(2003). 
108 Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998).  A slow hand pill is a 
mechanism that precludes newly elected boards from disabling a poison pill for a set period of 
time, such as six months.  Id. 
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board members and the associated exorbitant costs.109 
1.  Executive Compensation 
When the potential for significant personal benefit is high, hostile bids 
incentivize management to use poison pills to bargain with.110  Raiders realized 
that boards were holding target companies hostage, so they adjusted their 
approach and sweetened the deal for directors by including an increase in 
executive compensation in the package. 111   The increase in executive 
compensation caused merger and acquisition (M&A) activity to grow stronger 
because deals were friendlier with boards receiving a premium for 
relinquishing control of their companies.112 
Executive compensation evolved to convert the pill from a “just say no” 
remedy to a negotiation primer for moving deals forward. 113   In effect, 
executive compensation has sustained the market for corporate control. 114  
Managers from companies with strong anti-takeover defenses tend to have 
higher compensation.115  Extrapolated CEO pay reflects this phenomenon.116  
In the early 1990s, CEOs of large companies in the United States made 140 
times what corresponding workers made; whereas, by 2003 that number 
increased to 500 times more than what corresponding workers made.117 
Executive compensation works mainly because it aligns management’s 
interest with those of the shareholders.118  However, in the corporate control 
context, executive compensation can be excessive when it is used to reward 
relinquishing control rather than incentivizing better performance.119  Board 
members can command excessive executive compensation to relinquish control 
of a company despite the fact that these very board members are typically the 
reason for the low stock prices that made their companies targets.120  Michael 
 
109 Grundfest, supra note 9.   
110 Bebchuk et al., supra note 10.   
111 Kahan & Rock, supra note 11. 
112 Id. 
113 Kang, supra note 7, at 662. 
114 Id. 
115 See Kenneth A. Borokhovich, Kelly R. Brunarski, & Robert Parrino, CEO Contracting 
and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495, 1515 (1997). 
116 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 
1619 n.16 (2004). 
117 Id. 
118  Kang, supra note 7, at 625–26.  Executive compensation allows for management to 
receive something other than being let go.  Id. 
119 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12. 
120 Kang, supra note 7, at 665. 
2015                                                      POISON PILLS                                                      15 

Ovitz 121  serves as an example for amounts companies can pay to transfer 
control, as he received approximately $130 million despite serving only 25% of 
his employment contract period and despite alleged disappointing 
performance.122 
2.  Politicians as Fiduciaries 
Boards also have too much control when it comes to their control of 
company resources.  Boards can utilize these resources to further their own 
interests at the expense of shareholders.  Courts in the United States have ruled 
against poison pills; however, state legislatures have responded by sanctioning 
them.123  The U.S. Constitution supports the notion that political power comes 
from the people.124  The people grant political power to their elected agents to 
govern over their interests and bind them legally. 125   These elected 
representatives owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the principals126 who elected 
them because this is where the power derived.127  However, this duty is not 
normally “operationalized” in the form of being judicially enforceable.128 
As in corporate law, the courts should enforce the politician’s fiduciary 
duty of loyalty.129  This approach provides principals a remedy when agent 
politicians engage in self-dealing. 130   It also promotes a better alignment 
between the principal and agent’s interests.131 
 
121 Brehm v. Eisner (In re Litigation of Walt Disney Company Derivative), 906 A.2d 27, 35 
(Del. Ch. 2006).  Michael Ovitz entered into a five-year agreement to serve as president of The 
Walt Disney Company but only served in that capacity for fourteen months due to concerns about 
his performance.  Id. 
122 Id.  The court acknowledged that the facts supported the notion that Ovitz’s performance 
was subpar and that Ovitz lacked commitment because he performed services for other companies 
even though his employment contract required him to devote his time fully to Disney.  Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 265 (Del. 2000).    
123  CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 787 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 2006).  States 
authorize poison pills ex ante, i.e., without having responded to a court ruling.  Id. 
124 D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 712 (2013); see 
also U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People . . . do ordain and establish . . . .”). 
125 Rave, supra note 124. 
126  This article utilizes the following convention: Principals are parties that vote for 
politicians; whereas, agents are political representatives.   
127 Natelson, supra note 14. 
128 Rave, supra note 124, at 707.  “Operationalized” refers to the lack of processes in place to 
make politicians’ fiduciary duties judicially enforceable.  Id.    
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
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The similarities between corporate and political governance are obvious. 
Mainly, both are represented by principals who elect agents that can prefer 
their own interests over those of the principal.132  To be sure, the agents from 
each group make decisions that can bind the principals; whereas, these agents 
do not necessarily have to follow the instructions of the majority of the 
shareholders or voting public. 133   In fact, the agency problem is more 
problematic when it comes to politics because, unlike corporations where a 
shareholder can sell their shares, voters in political primaries lack ways for 
exiting their agency relationship.134  
Representatives are burdened with an interest in retaining the power that 
comes with their elected positions, and this dynamic can present a conflict with 
the interests of the general public.  Where there is a potential conflict of 
interest, the public should not trust agents to act in their interest.  As such, 
representatives should not be trusted to act in the interest of the people.135  An 
example is where politicians vote to raise their own salaries.136  They cannot do 
so without affecting the general public.137 
More importantly, agents may utilize their control over lawmaking to 
entrench themselves. 138   They may favor the interest of their constituent 
corporate donors rather than the general public to stay rooted in their elected 
positions.139  Boards can control corporate political donations, and they have 
the ability to funnel money to representatives who pass legislation that can give 
the boards power over corporate control decisions.140  
Political lawmaking regarding poison pill legislation presents a conflict 
of interest.141  Public opinion may diverge when it comes to favoring whether 
politicians should represent the interest of their constituents versus those of the 
general public.142  It is likely, however, that the consensus would not sanction 
politicians acting mainly in their own interest.143 
 
132 Id. at 706. 
133 See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 519–22 (2001) (noting the delineation of power 
of the people and politicians).   
134 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 104–05 (Harvard Univ. Press 
1970). 
135 Rave, supra note 124, at 715. 
136 Id. at 714.   
137 Id.   
138 Id.   
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Rave, supra note 124, at 714. 
142 Id. at 719. 
143 Id. 
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B.  Remedying the Problem: Reeling in the Power 
As the problem exists in the legislation, the solution lies there as well.  
Legislators can adjust poison pill legislation to protect shareholder ownership 
rights by repealing anti-takeover statutes and replacing them with a regulatory 
regime which guarantees shareholders’ right to vote on offers for their shares.  
In their approach, legislators can eliminate board veto power, establishing a 
shareholder approval safety valve.  Boards would be able to vote under this 
regime on attempts to acquire their companies; however, shareholders should 
have the final say. 
1.  Statutory Regimes 
Most states have statutory regimes that enable boards to utilize poison 
pills that prevent unwanted bids. 144   Boards combine poison pills with 
staggered boards145 to create powerful veto power.146 Eliminating board veto 
power could provide a safe harbor against management conflicts of interest, 
especially where there is a shareholder approval safety valve.147  Otherwise, the 
absence of the disciplinary affect of shareholder review could allow managers 
to shirk their responsibility.148   Moreover, veto power enables managers to 
perform poorly and retain corporate control or receive exorbitant compensation 
on their way out.149  Importantly, veto power could provide boards the authority 
to block offers that are beneficial to shareholders.150 
The current regulatory regime implies mandated deference because 
boards make the choice regarding whether a bid moves forward.151  This does 
not mean that boards can obtain better results than shareholders themselves.152  
Boards should be allowed to negotiate, just like attorneys who bargain for their 
clients, provided that shareholders are able to make the final decision.  
 
144 Bebchuk et al., supra note 10. 
145 Id. at 893–99.  A staggered board is one such that groups of board members go up for re-
election, often in elections years apart, rather than all of them in one year.  Id.  Shareholders have 
to wait to have an opportunity to replace board members who block hostile bidders they favor 
under the staggered board structure because unfavorable board members may not be up for 
reelection until several years in the future.  Id.       
146 Id. 
147 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 973, 978 (2002).  
148 Id. at 1012. 
149 Id. at 993–94. 
150 Id. at 1000. 
151 Id. at 978. 
152 Id. 
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Historical data supports this view.153   For example, research indicates that 
managers will sacrifice shareholder value in exchange for better treatment of 
managers.154  Additionally, on average, shareholders experience a loss when 
management defeats offers.155  Protections from anti-takeover statutes cause 
managerial slack156  as well as poor operating performance.157   In addition, 
poison pills can add between 6% and 12% to the cost of an acquisition,158 and 
this can be significant because the extra cost could drive away an offer that 
shareholders would otherwise welcome.  
2.  Shareholder Voting 
The main antitakeover prescription consists of a poison pill combined 
with a staggered board.159  This “cocktail” does not allow shareholders to vote 
on a board’s decisions to reject bids. 160   One commentator believes that 
“[n]either the finance literature nor the norms of corporate law support vesting 
such unbalanced power in the hands of the board.”161  The main inquiry should 
be who is more likely to make better decisions – target boards and their related 
consultants or the judiciary, the market, or shareholders.162  
Economists recognize that the market typically includes in the model for 
valuing a company, its future cash flows, and the propensity for management to 
make investment decisions.163  Arguably, a lack of independence exists where 
management judges its own capabilities.  However, a “bilateral decision 
structure,” which allows shareholders to vote on board takeover decisions, 
synthesizes these two approaches because neither can unilaterally act on a 
 
153 Bebchuk, supra note 147, at 979. 
154 Id. 
155 See James F. Cotter & Marc Zenner, How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer 
Process, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 86 (1994). 
156 See generally Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullinathan, Is There Discretion in Wage 
Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON 535 (1999). 
157 See Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii, & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8449, 2001), http://papers.nber. 
org/papers/w8449.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). 
158  William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protections of the Poison 
Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 181 (2003).   
159 Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search 
For Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 561 (2002). 
160 Id.   
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 553. 
163 Id. 
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bid.164  In fact, shareholder voting provides additional oversight for preventing 
bad board decisions.165  
One commentator argues that Delaware General Corporation Law section 
141166 promulgates that “the corporation’s business and affairs are ‘managed 
by or under the direction of a board of directors.’"167  As such, boards typically 
make corporate decisions, while shareholders have no right to initiate action; 
rather, they are relegated to the role of reviewing few board actions.168  
Still, shareholders have rights, including the right to vote and to sell their 
shares.169  Of these two rights, shareholders typically hold the right to sell 
shares to be of more value.170  The right to sell shares should be protected just 
as the right to vote is protected.171  Taken seriously, directors should not be 
able to interfere with this right.172 
Antitakeover statutes are fundamentally misguided and thus should be 
repealed. 173   This legislation was based on a misguided premise; i.e., that 
hostile takeovers are bad.174  Public opinion suggests that (hostile) takeovers 
that resulted in companies selling off pieces destroyed jobs.175  However, the 
business divisions were typically sold to new owners, and job losses were 
attributable to the market.176  On the other hand, these takeovers generated 
huge returns, forcing companies to access unrealized value by improving 
efficiencies.177  As such, legislators should reconsider these statutes and repeal 
them.178 
 
164 See generally Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's 
Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994).   
165 Black & Kraakman, supra note 159, at 560. 
166 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §141(a) (2001).   
167 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 601, 603 (2006). 
168 Id. 
169 Velasco, supra note 16. 
170 Velasco, supra note 18. 
171 Id. at 627.   
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 675. 
174  See generally Dale Arthur Oesterle, Revisiting the Anti-Takeover Fervor of the '80s 
Through the Letters of Warren Buffett: Current Acquisition Practice is Clogged By Legal Flotsam 
from the Decade, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 565 (1997). 
175 Id. 
176 See id. at 607–08. 
177 Velasco, supra note 18, at 676. 
178 Id. at 675. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Poison pill legislation should be repealed.  Politicians should enact 
statutes which allow shareholders the right to vote on transferring the company 
to a bidder regardless of board of director approval.  The hostile takeover 
regulatory regime has evolved.  As the state of incorporation of most national 
corporations, Delaware has filled the void where the federal government has 
been reluctant to participate with legislation that affects key players in the 
market for corporate control.179  Of these players, poison pills favor company 
board of directors. 180   However, this favoritism is at the expense of the 
shareholder’s fundamental right to sell their shares.  The favoritism has also 
allowed inept and fraudulent company leaders to negatively affect key 
stakeholders, including the general public.181  
 In essence, poison pill legislation provides company boards too much 
control; i.e., they can demand exorbitant compensation packages in exchange 
for relinquishing corporate control 182  and use company assets to influence 
politicians to enact favorable legislation.183  Legislators owe shareholders a 
duty of loyalty.184  In order to salvage shareholder’s right to entertain fair offers 
and sell their shares, politicians should reconsider statutes authorizing poison 
pills and repeal them.  Politicians should simultaneously enact shareholder-
friendly legislation, i.e., statutes which allow shareholders the right to vote and 
entertain bids for their company even if the company board disagrees. 
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179 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141. 
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